


Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000400030057-7

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000400030057-7



CHECKLIST OF QUOTABLE QUOTES ON SOVIET AND ORBIT ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY

General

Not even the earlier totalitarian states of modern times gave to their secret police and spy-masters the scope and power that the government of the USSR has given to its intelligence services. Soviet leadership ranks internal security and foreign intelligence on the same level as military service in importance to the State. Members of the service receive rewards and prestige that place them high in the Soviet elite. A career in this service in many cases is the route to top Soviet power.

The major Soviet service, the KGB (Committee for State Security) has total strength, including security troops and support arm, of 340,000. About 60,000 are staff members engaged in intelligence work. Approximately 10,000 of the latter group operate abroad. The Soviet military intelligence service, GRU, has a staff of approximately 10,000. The number of Soviet intelligence personnel stationed in East Berlin alone is 550 to 600.

Satellite Services

Soviet intelligence leadership has placed "Advisors" in counterpart services organized in the Satellites, and security

services play a leading role in all Satellite nations. These "Advisors", who are really "Controllers", have access to all files, operations, and reports. They manage these services and can penetrate them at will. In effect, the 15 Satellite services exist for servicing Soviet military and political objectives. They form a network of espionage and subversion, world-wide in scope, controlled and directed by the Soviets.

Cover

Fifty to sixty percent of Soviet officials stationed abroad are engaged in espionage. In some countries 80 to 90 percent of Soviet officials have been identified as intelligence personnel. Other forms of cover are:

Travelling delegations of various kinds. In one instance intelligence officers number half of a Soviet sports group.

Technicians, especially in such key areas as the Near East, Africa, and Cuba.

Trade delegation and TASS newspaper agency representations.

Soviet "Illegal" Networks

These are Soviet or other nationals masquerading as citizens of a western country. Colonel Rudolf Abel is an example of an illegal agent operated by the KGB in the U. S. Another illegal, Gordon Arnold Lonsdale - who spent a large portion of his early life in the U. S. under his real name, Conon Malody - was exposed in the UK early in 1961. With Lonsdale in the net, were two American Communists, the Morris Cohens, who in England were documented as New Zealanders under the name of KROGER.

Both the KGB and the GRU are expending great efforts on this kind of operation. Because of the difficulty of identifying their members, Soviet illegal agents and networks are the greatest threat to U. S. and Western security.

Targets

In recent years there has been a concentrated Soviet intelligence effort inside the USSR and out, to establish personal contact with individual Americans, especially students, travellers, and employees of official American installations. Sexual entrapment and blackmail are favored techniques. In 1956 alone, such

Soviet attempts abroad numbered about 200. The number has risen steadily, we believe. Almost no week goes by without its quota of direct or indirect approaches to Americans by Soviets who are identified intelligence and security operatives.

A typical operation was directed in early 1961 by Yevgeny ZACSTROVTSKY, a former second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington who had been unofficially asked to leave the U. S. in 1959. By 1961 he was one of several hundred intelligence specialists in Karlsruh, East Germany. From this center he dispatched to West Germany an agent who posed as a naturalized American and who met and seduced a female employee of the American forces in Germany. The agent soon moved to Berlin. A few weeks later the young lady was told by an intermediary that her friend was languishing in an East Berlin hospital. After her second visit there she accepted from the "patient" a package for his landlord. On leaving the hospital, she was arrested and searched. The package contained photographs of East German military equipment. A Soviet officer then promised to release the girl and her boy-friend if she agreed to provide coded telegrams concerning the U. S. policy in the Berlin crisis and the Soviet Union.

Arrests and Convictions of Soviet Agents

In the Free World 393 persons have been tried and convicted for espionage carried out for the Soviet Union during the past six years. The breakdown is as follows:

Denmark	-	7
Finland	-	68
France	-	1
The Netherlands	-	2
Japan	-	1
Norway	-	15
Sweden	-	11
Turkey	-	2
United Kingdom	-	10
United States	-	15
West Germany	-	264

Soviet Officials Expelled for Espionage

During the decade 1951-1961 a total of 62 principal Soviet officials were exposed as espionage operators and declared persona non grata or expelled. The totals by years:

1951	-	1	1956	-	11
1952	-	2	1957	-	13
1953	-	2	1958	-	7
1954	-	6	1959	-	8
1955	-	2	1960	-	8

1961 - 2 (figures for 1961 not complete)

The count by country is:

Argentina	-	5
Denmark	-	3
Iran	-	1
Italy	-	2
Mexico	-	2
The Netherlands	-	4
Norway	-	1
Poland	-	1
Sweden	-	3
Switzerland	-	3
Thailand	-	2
Turkey	-	4
United Kingdom	-	5

United Nations	-	10
United States	-	13
Uruguay	-	1
Venezuela	-	1
West Germany	-	1

Among these PNC's from the U. S. are a succession of Soviet officers who engaged from 1953 to 1960 in procuring aerial photographs. A typical case is that of Assistant Soviet Air Attache Leonid E. PIVNEV, who illegally attempted to induce a Washington, D. C. photographer to take aerial photographs of New York City.

Assassination and Kidnapping are standard Soviet intelligence and security service techniques. The record on Soviet kidnappings and murders goes back as far as the early twenties but are unavoidably incomplete because the deaths and disappearances of many anti-Communists - such as the seeming suicide of General Walter Krivitsky in a Washington hotel room on 9 February 1941 - are not provably the work of Soviet agents. Since 1945 Russian emigres have been principal target. These executive operations are usually undertaken by the KGB which devotes considerable

energy to research in new, more efficient methods of assassination.

An ingenious miniaturized silent pistol which fired a cyanide-loaded bullet was given to Nikolay KHOKHLOV, a KGB defector, for an emigre assassination in 1954. Three years later KHOKHLOV himself nearly died from a dose of radioactive Thallium which he believed was administered by his ex-colleagues. In August 1961 a KGB defector named STACHENSKY confessed to having murdered a Ukrainian emigre leader, Stephan BANDERA, in October 1959. STACHENSKY, currently awaiting trial in West Germany, used a poison ejecting airgun of special design.

Soviet Bloc Forgeries and Anti-U.S. Propaganda

In June of 1961 testimony was presented by the Agency to the Internal Security Sub-Committee of the Senate testimony about Soviet Bloc forgeries. It was shown that during the past four years the Soviet Bloc has produced 32 forgeries designed to look as though they were documents sent to or from American officials. The 32, in turn, are but a fraction of all the fabrications aimed against the West.

Soviet Subsidization and Training of Foreign Communist Parties

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been largely successful in directing the subversive activities of the remaining Communist Parties throughout the world. One means of achieving domination has been the CPSU training program for foreign Communists, accelerated since 1936. Each year more than 300 Free World Communists are enrolled at the USSR's Higher Party School. Another method is financing. For example, Soviet subsidies to the Communist Parties of France and Italy are reliably estimated to amount annually to approximately \$8,000,000 each. A third technique is the international Communist conference. In November 1960 the 61st Party Conference assembled in Moscow. Among the international delegates were Latin American party leaders. At this meeting a basis for subsequent Communist action throughout Latin America was discussed. By January of 1961 it became evident that Castro and the Cuban Communists were collaborating fully. Parties and fronts throughout Latin America united in intensified support of Castro. A regional Communist conference was held in Havana in May, and before this year ended Castro announced openly his allegiance to the Communist faith.